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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________________________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
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Angel Laychock brought this action in federal court, alleging fifteen claims 
against Defendant Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (AWells Fargo@).  Wells Fargo had 
obtained a default judgment against Laychock in a separate foreclosure action in the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.  The District Court ultimately dismissed all of 
Laychock=s claims, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, res judicata, and relevant 
statutes of limitations.  Laychock subsequently reinstated her mortgage and the 
Defendants vacated the default in the state court action.  The District Court then denied 
Laychock=s motions to amend her complaint and for relief from judgment.  Laychock 
appeals the dismissal of her claims and the denials of her two motions.  We will affirm.1     
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we set forth only the facts and history 
that are relevant to our conclusion.  Angel Laychock obtained a mortgage from Wells 
Fargo.  Laychock arranged for bi-weekly automatic payments toward this mortgage from 
her bank, Wachovia.  Laychock alleges that in December 2006 Wells Fargo began to 
withdraw additional bi-weekly payments from her account.  She claims that, as a result, 
she incurred insufficient funds and late fee charges. Wells Fargo investigated and 
reversed three of seven duplicative payments and contacted credit reporting agencies to 
make them aware of the error.   
 
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1332.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. ' 1291.  
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In July 2007, Wachovia, which had become a successor-in-interest to Wells Fargo, 
filed a foreclosure action against Laychock, alleging she had not made a monthly 
payment since April 1, 2007.  Wachovia obtained a default judgment.  Laychock 
subsequently filed a petition to open the default, in which she claimed that Defendants 
had double debited her account and did not give her proper credit for amounts debited.  
Before receiving a decision on her petition in state court, Laychock filed this 
action in federal court, claiming wrongful foreclosure and damages for incorrect credit 
reports.  Her initial Complaint included fifteen counts, but on appeal she raises only her 
claim under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (Athe 
UTPCPL@).  As this case was pending in the District Court, the state court denied 
Laychock=s petition to open the default.  Laychock chose not to appeal the state court=s 
decision.  
The District Court dismissed Laychock=s Complaint, finding that it lacked 
jurisdiction, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, to hear most of Laychock=s claims B 
including those brought under the UTPCPL B and that res judicata precluded her claims.2  
To satisfy the UTPCPL, Laychock must prove that Defendants engaged in Afraudulent or 
deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding.@  73 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. ' 201-2.  The Court found that, in rejecting Laychock=s petition to 
 
2 Rooker-Feldman Aprecludes lower federal courts from exercising appellate 
jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.@  In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 
2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted).  
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open the default, the state court had rejected Laychock=s assertions that the Defendants 
double debited her account.  Accordingly, the Court concluded that Laychock=s claims for 
money damages, predicated on the alleged double debiting and wrongful foreclosure, 
would require it to find that the state court=s decision was wrong, in violation of the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  In the alternative, the court found that res judicata applied.  
Finally, certain other claims, which are not at issue in this appeal, were time-barred. 
II. 
We exercise plenary review over a District Court=s decision granting a motion to 
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Edgar v. Avaya, 503 F.3d 340, 
344 (3d Cir. 2007).  We Aaccept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.@  Id.  We review the decision to 
deny leave to amend for abuse of discretion.  Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 
330-31 (3d Cir. 2007).  Denial of a motion for relief from judgment, pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), is also reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.  
Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).   
Plaintiff seeks damages based on a Awrongful foreclosure@ and the double debiting 
of her bank account, which allegedly resulted in insufficient funds and late fee charges.  
Any claim relying on allegations of wrongful foreclosure must be rejected under the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  As we recently declared, Athere are four requirements that 
must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in 
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state court; (2) the plaintiff >complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court 
judgments=; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) 
the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.@  Great 
W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, B F.3d B , 2010 WL 3035466, at *6 (3d 
Cir. Aug. 5, 2010).  In a recent case that also involved a state-court foreclosure 
proceeding, In re Madera, we found that Rooker-Feldman precluded us from exercising 
jurisdiction where, as here, to grant the requested relief the District Court would have 
been required to Adetermine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered.@  586 
F.3d at 232 (internal quotations and citation omitted).  All four of the requirements we 
outlined in Great Western are satisfied here and the relief from a Awrongful foreclosure@ 
requested by Laychock would have required the District Court to determine that the state 
court erroneously entered judgment.  Accordingly, we find Laychock=s claims based on 
wrongful foreclosure barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.     
The District Court also found that Plaintiff=s claims for damages due to the double 
debiting of her account were barred, under both Rooker-Feldman and the doctrine of 
claim preclusion.  We do not need to address the Rooker-Feldman argument because we 
agree with the District Court that these claims are precluded.  Pennsylvania law regarding 
claim preclusion essentially mirrors the federal doctrine.  ARes judicata, or claim 
preclusion, is a doctrine by which a former adjudication bars a later action on all or part 
of the claim which was the subject of the first action. Any final, valid judgment on the 
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction precludes any future suit between the parties 
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or their privies on the same cause of action.@  Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d 
309, 313 (Pa. 1995) (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)).  The doctrine 
applies not only to claims that are actually litigated, but also to those that could have been 
litigated in the first proceeding, so long as they were part of the same cause of action.  Id.  
Applying Pennsylvania law in Riverside Memorial Mausoleum, Inc. v. UMET Trust, 581 
F.2d 62, 66-67 (3d Cir. 1978), we held that res judicata bars consideration in a second 
suit of defenses raised in a petition to open, as well as defenses that the party Amight 
have, but did not raise.@  Plaintiff raised the issue of double debiting in her petition to 
open the default judgment, presenting it as a defense to the foreclosure action.  (App. at 
60.)  Accordingly, we affirm the District Court=s conclusion that Laychock is precluded 
from bringing these claims in federal court. 
The cases relied upon by Laychock do not alter our analysis.  Laychock is correct 
that, applying Pennsylvania preclusion doctrine, we have rejected the view that a Acourt=s 
refusal to open [a] default judgment[] constituted a judgment on the merits which 
precluded relitigation of the issue@ when the issue for which preclusion was sought was 
not Aessential@ to the judgment.  In re Graves, 33 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 1994).  However, 
in this case the District Court found, and we concur, that claim preclusion and not issue 
preclusion bars Laychock=s claims.   
Following the dismissal of her federal complaint, Plaintiff reinstated her mortgage. 
At that time, Wells Fargo filed to vacate the default.  Plaintiff then filed a motion in 
federal court to reinstate her claims, based on the vacatur of the default.  She sought to 
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invoke Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), which permits relief when a Ajudgment . 
. . is based on an earlier judgment has been reversed or vacated.@  Laychock argued that 
with the state court judgment vacated, Rooker-Feldman no longer applied.  Laychock 
also filed a separate motion for leave to file an amended complaint.  Oral argument was 
held and at argument Plaintiff dropped all of her claims except those under the UTPCPL.   
The District Court denied Laychock=s motion for relief from judgment, on the 
grounds that she had not demonstrated Aexceptional circumstances@ that would merit 
discretionary relief under Rule 60(b)(5).  Boughner v. Sec=y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 
572 F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir. 1978).  The Aextraordinary circumstances standard applicable 
to the trial court=s exercise of discretion is a strict one@ and our review is 
Acommensurately narrow.@  Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 754 F.2d 120, 
127 (3d Cir. 1985).  Laychock cured her mortgage default, which caused the Defendants 
to request that the default judgment be vacated, within eight days of the District Court=s 
dismissal of her claims.  She then returned to the Court, seeking relief under Rule 
60(b)(5).  We agree with the District Court that this course of action did not constitute the 
sort of Aextraordinary circumstances@ that merit relief under Rule 60 and accordingly 
affirm its decision on this issue.  The District Court also denied Plaintiff=s motion to 
amend her complaint, finding it would be futile.  Laychock sought leave to amend her 
complaint so as to adequately state a claim on three causes of action that are no longer at 
issue on appeal.  Moreover, Laychock=s attorney conceded at argument on the motion that 
even if given leave to amend, she would be unable to plead adequate facts to support 
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these claims.  (App. 238-40.)  Laychock=s brief provides no argument on this issue, 
merely quoting applicable legal standards.  Furthermore, we have held where, as here, a 
party fails to provide a draft amended complaint, that this provides an adequate basis for 
denying a request to amend.  Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 374 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Accordingly, the denial of the motion to amend was not an abuse of discretion.     
III. 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the District Court.   
 
